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The Modern Concept of Duty: Hoyem v. Manhattan
Beach City School District and School District
Liability for Injuries to Truants
By Matthew .4. Hodel*
Introduction
California tort law has long imposed liability on school authorities
who fail to adequately supervise the conduct of students on school
grounds.' Recently the California Supreme Court in Hoyem v. Man-
hattan Beach City School District2 was presented for the first time with
a claim that on-premises negligent supervision was actionable even
though the actual injury occurred off-campus while the student was tru-
ant.3 The injured pupil, Michael Hoyem, was a ten-year-old boy en-
rolled in the summer session of a local elementary school. During the
school day, and before his final classes were dismissed, Michael left the
* B.A., 1977, California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo. Member,
Second Year Class.
1. See, e.g., Ahern v. Livermore Union High School Dist., 208 Cal. 770,284 P.2d 1105
(1930); Buzzard v. East Lake School Dist., 34 Cal. App. 2d 316, 93 P.2d 233 (1939). See also
Note, Negligence Liability of School-Teachers in California, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 567, 567
(1964).
School districts are vicariously liable for the tortious acts and omissions of employees to
the same extent that such acts or omissions would raise a direct cause of action against such
employees. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2 (West 1966).
Private schools are subject to the same principles of liability for injuries resulting from
negligent supervision. Martin v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 158 Cal. App. 2d 64,322 P.2d
31 (1958) (by implication); Stockwell v. Board of Trustees, 64 Cal. App. 2d 197, 148 P.2d 405
(1944).
2. 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978).
3. Petition for Hearing at 15, Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal.
3d 508, 585 P.2d 851, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978). As will be discussed in this Note, the question
presented was unique with respect to the allegation that the obligation to provide reasonable
supervision includes the duty to prevent students from leaving campus without permission.
See notes 22, 51-52 & accompanying text infra. But Vf, Satariano v. Sleight, 54 Cal. App. 2d
278, 129 P.2d 35 (1942) (nonsuit for school official reversed where student struck by automo-
bile while running across public street between gymnasium and athletic field). Satariano is
distinguishable from Hoyem since it deals with off-campus injuries to students who were
authorized to leave the premises and yet who had not received ample warning of traffic
hazards.
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school grounds without permission.4 At a nearby intersection he was
struck and seriously injured by a negligent motorcyclist. 5
Michael and his mother sued the school district 6 for personal inju-
ries and damages, alleging that the district's failure to take proper pre-
cautions against truancy was the cause of the injury.7 The school
district acknowledged its obligation to provide on-campus supervision,8
but demurred to the complaint, contending that both the Education
Code and case law shielded it from liability for off-campus injuries to
truants.9 The trial judge sustained the demurrer' o and the court of ap-
peals affirmed." I
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed. The majority,
in an opinion written by Justice Tobriner,' 2 rejected the contention that
truants are barred from recovering for off-campus injuries and rein-
stated the plaintiffs' cause of action for negligence based upon breach
of a duty to exercise due care in supervising Michael while he was on
campus.' 3 Justices Clark and Richardson 14 in strong dissenting opin-
ions argued that public policy should preclude imposition of a duty to
4. CAL. EDuC. CODE § 48260 (West 1978) defines a "truant" as any student subject to
compulsory education who is absent more than three school days without an excuse or is
tardy in excess of thirty minutes on each of more than three school days in the same school
year. Courts, however, describe any juvenile who leaves campus without permission as a
truant, regardless of the number of prior, unauthorized departures or tardies. See In re
Jorge S., 74 Cal. App. 3d 852, 857, 141 Cal. Rptr. 722, 724-25 (1977). The Justices in Hoyem
also described the plaintiff as a truant without regard to a prior history of truancy or tardi-
ness. 22 Cal. 3d at 519, 585 P.2d at 857, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 7. See also CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 48264 (West 1978) (dealing with the "arrest of truants," it empowers authorities to arrest
any student found away from school during the school day without a valid excuse).
In this Note, "truant" is used to describe only those students who arrive at school and
then leave during the school day without permission. "Truant" does not include those stu-
dents who never arrive at school and remain away during the entire school day.
5. 22 Cal. 3d at 512, 585 P.2d at 853, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
6. A separate action was filed against the driver of the motorcycle. Id. at 512 n. 1, 585
P.2d at 853, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
7. Additionally, Mrs. Hoyem sought damages for her loss of Michael's "comfort and
society" and for the injuries she suffered on viewing Michael in his injured state at the
hospital. The supreme court sustained a demurrer on these causes of action, reaffirming
several of its prior holdings. Id. at 512, 585 P.2d at 853, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 3. The aspect of
the decision relating to Mrs. Hoyem's personal causes of action has no bearing upon the
issues of truancy and negligent supervision and is beyond the scope of this Note.
8. Opposition to Petition for Hearing at 2 n.l.
9. 22 Cal. 3d at 514-18, 585 P.2d at 854-57, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 4-7. See also notes 57-63
& accompanying text infra.
10. Id. at 512, 585 P.2d at 853, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
11. Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 2d Civ. No. 48605, slip op. at 10
(Cal. Ct. App. July 21, 1977).
12. Chief Justice Bird, Justice Manuel and Justice Newman concurred.
13. Id. at 513-20, 585 P.2d at 853-58, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 3-8. See notes 51-63 & accompa-
nying text infra.
14. Justice Mosk concurred with the dissenting Justices.
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prevent injuries to truants. 15
This Note will discuss the Hoyem decision in two contexts. First,
inquiry is directed to the holding of the case. The legal, political, and
economic arguments offered by both parties on appeal, the resolution
of the issues by the Tobriner majority, and the response thereto by the
dissenting Justices are examined. The second half of this Note ex-
amines Hoyem and its relation to the modem concept of duty. The
trend to simplify and expand this element of negligence is analyzed in
an attempt to decipher those factors most significant to its imposition.
Next, the role these factors played in the Hoyem "duty balance" is
identified. Finally, this Note suggests that the new approach to ques-
tions of duty as applied in Hoyem fails to sufficiently address the prob-
lem that truancy presents to educational administration and that, as a
result, the Hoyem court attempted to resolve issues more properly left
to legislative solution.
Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District: Negligent
Supervision and the Truant
Hoyem presented a novel question to the California Supreme
Court: is a school district liable for injuries sustained off campus by a
pupil who voluntarily and without authorization leaves school premises
during the school day? The possible answers to this issue may best be
understood by examining the theories of liability offered by the
Hoyems and nonliability offered by the school district.
The Hoyem's Appeal
Despite the off-campus situs of the injury, Michael Hoyem and his
mother urged that their appeal should be controlled by the principle
that schools have a duty to supervise students who are on school
grounds during the school day.16 School authorities are generally held
to an on-campus standard of care similar to that of private citizens act-
ing in a private context: a teacher or school authority on school grounds
must protect and supervise students according to the standard of a pru-
dent and ordinary person entrusted with the care of school-age chil-
15. Id. at 523-28, 585 P.2d at 860-63, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 10-13. See notes 75-84 & accom-
panying text infra.
16. Petition for Hearing at 6, Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d
508, 585 P.2d 851, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1978. See generally Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 747, 470 P.2d 360, 363, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1970); Dugan, Teachers'
Tart Liability, 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 512, 514 (1962); Mancke, Liability of School Districts
for the Negligent Acts of Their Employees, I J.L. & EDUC. 109, 117-27 (1972); Proehl, Tort
Liability of Teachers, 12 VAND. L. Rav. 723, 739-51 (1959); Seitz, LegalResponsibility Under
Tort Law of School Personnel and School Districts as Regards Negligent Conduct Toward
Pupils, 15 HASTINGS L.J 495, 498-508 (1964).
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dren.' 7 School districts in turn, are vicariously liable for the school
ground negligence of individual teachers. 8 Questions relating to the
adequacy and reasonableness of supervision,' 9 insufficiency of supervi-
sion as a proximate cause of the injury20 and the foreseeability of harm
are2' resolved by the trier of fact.
The success of the Hoyems' appeal depended upon a determina-
tion of the scope of a teacher's duty to supervise. While the rules im-
posing liability for negligence resulting in on-campus injuries were
well-established, 22 the applicability of these rules was unclear regard-
ing a student who was able to leave school grounds because of inade-
quate supervision and who was subsequently injured. A stumbling
block for the Hoyems was the substantial body of statutory and deci-
sional authority that explicitly precludes school liability for certain
types of off-campus injuries. Generally, decisional law denies the exist-
ence of a duty of care when students are travelling to and from
school, 23 have been sent home from school before the end of the school
day24 or engage in off-campus activities unrelated to any school pur-
17. Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 747, 470 P.2d 360, 363,
87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1970); Lilienthal v. San Leandro Unified School Dist., 139 Cal. App.
2d 453, 456, 293 P.2d 889, 891 (1956). Lack of ordinary care on the part of school officials
may result from the total absence of supervision or ineffective supervision. Dailey v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. 2 Cal. 3d at 747, 470 P.2d at 363, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
18. This vicarious liability is the effect of CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8 15.2(a) (West 1966).
For a general discussion and survey of school district liability statutes, see Mancke, Liability
of School Districts for the Negligent Acts of Their Employees, I J.L. & EDUC. 109, 113-17
(1972).
19. E.g., Ziegler v. Santa Cruz City High School Dist., 168 Cal. App. 2d 277, 284, 335
P.2d 709, 713 (1959).
20. E.g., Beck v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 225 Cal. App. 2d 503, 508, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 471, 474 (1964).
21. Cf. Wright v. Arcade School Dist., 230 Cal. App. 2d 272,279,40 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815
(1964) (Although foreseeability of harm is an element of duty, it becomes a question of fact
rather than a question of law where the ultimate duty issue rests upon foreseeability of
harm).
22. See e.g., authorities cited notes 1, 16 supra.
23. See e.g., Gilbert v. Sacramento Unified School Dist., 258 Cal. App. 2d 505, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 913 (1968) (no duty to prevent child from crossing dangerous railroad tracks on way
home from school); Wright v. Arcade School Dist., 230 Cal. App. 2d 272, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1964) (no duty to provide supervision at busy intersection which child crossed on way to
school); Girard v. Monrovia City School Dist., 121 Cal. App. 2d 737, 264 P.2d 115 (1953)
(no duty to provide transportation for child transferred to a less safely reached school).
24. In Kerwin v. County of San Mateo, 176 Cal. App. 2d 304, 1 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1959),
an eleven-year-old boy was asked to take his younger brother, who had become ill, home
from school. On the way home, the older boy was injured. In holding that there was no
duty owed by the school district, the court observed that the plaintiff had failed to allege why
the boy could not safely negotiate his own way home and appreciate danger when
"[t]housands of I1-year-old school boys, as well as those of younger years, travel to and
from school daily without school supervision." Id. at 309, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 440. The Kerwin
court found it significant that the defendant had not undertaken to provide transportation
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pose.25 The rules derived from these cases have a statutory basis in
section 44808 of the California Education Code.26 This statute negates
any duty to supervise students who are not on school property and lim-
its duty to the school ground area unless the district "has undertaken to
provide transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises
. . . has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability
or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. ' 27 In
the event of an undertaking of this nature, liability is imposed "only
while such pupil is or should be under the immediate and direct super-
vision of an employee of such district or board."28
Apparently both the trial court and the court of appeal felt that
section 44808 and the surrounding body of decisional law, rather than
the cases establishing an on-campus duty, were controlling on the issue
of duty. The assumptions underlying both courts' reasoning were that
if there had been a breach of duty, it was the failure to supervise
Michael after he left the premises and that the breach occurred at the
situs of the injury, the intersection.29 Thus, because the plaintiff was
travelling from school and his presence at the intersection was both
voluntary and unrelated to any school purpose, the trial court held the
district owed him no duty. The court of appeal reasoned, moreover,
that even assuming arguendo that a duty was owed under these circum-
stances, the defendant had no reason to foresee any harmd to the
plaintiff.30
Before the California Supreme Court, the Hoyems insisted the
lower court rulings were the result of an erroneous interpretation of the
duty and breach asserted in their complaint. They had alleged that the
breach occurred while Michael was on school grounds where teachers
for the two boys nor did it have knowledge that the boys were going to ride home tandem on
a bicycle built for one rider. Id. at 307, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 439. Cf. Hanson v. Reedley Joint
Union High School Dist., 43 Cal. App. 2d 643, 111 P.2d 415 (1941) (school district liable
where tennis coach arranged for a student known to be a reckless driver and known to have
a dangerous car to transport students home after tennis practice).
25. In Castro v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 54 Cal. App. 3d 232, 126 Cal. Rptr. 537
(1976), a case arising out of the death of a student participating in an R.O.T.C. summer
outing, the court reasoned that school district liability for off-campus injuries was preserved
where the activity was part of a school curriculum, such as a band or orchestra performance
or a class that meets off school grounds, which required attendance at an off-premises event.
Other students who engage in non-required field trips or excursions could not bring an ac-
tion since the "voluntary nature of the event absolves the district of liability." Id. at 236, 126
Cal. Rptr. at 540.
26. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48808 (West 1978).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Brief of Appellants at 15-22; Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 2d Civ.
No. 48605, slip op. at 10. (Cal. Ct. App. July 21, 1977).
30. Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist. 2d Civ. No. 48605, slip op. at 10
(Cal. Ct. App. July 21, 1977).
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and other administrators had an established duty to provide reasonable
supervision.3' Under this interpretation the trial and appeals courts'
reliance on the situs of the injury and the status of the plaintiff as a
truant were asserted to be mistaken. The plaintiffs argued that they
never had alleged that the law imposes a duty toward truants or stu-
dents off-campus. 32 They had simply contended that the applicable au-
thority was that imposing a duty of ordinary care on-campus.33
As support for this argument, the Hoyems cited two provisions of
the California Education Code. Section 44807 empowers school au-
thorities to "control" students and to hold them strictly accountable on
the playground and during recess for the purpose of protecting student
health and safety. 34 Whether this provision was intended solely to pro-
tect students from each other was not argued, the Hoyems offered it
only to establish a duty of schoolyard supervision. 35 They also cited an
exception to section 44808's preclusion of a duty to prevent off-campus
injuries, contending the district had undertaken to supervise Michael
when he arrived at school yet "had failed to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances. ' 36 The Hoyems argued that taken together
these statutes indicated that the duty to prevent unauthorized depar-
tures was included within the duty to exercise reasonable supervision.37
They further maintained that the districts failure to discharge its
duty of reasonable care was the proximate cause of Michael's injuries.3 8
The Hoyems concluded that Michael's departure from the school
grounds and his subsequent injury were foreseeable, despite the inter-
vening negligent third party, because the combination of summertime
distractions and inadequate control were likely to encourage young
children to be mischievious. 39
31. Brief of Appellants at 16. See notes 1, 16-21 & accompanying text supra.
32. Brief of Appellants at 17.
33. Id. at 10-12, 16-17.
34. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44807 (West 1978) provides in pertinent part that school au-
thorities shall exercise reasonable care on school grounds to the same extent that a parent
could to protect the health and safety of pupils.
35. Brief of Appellants at 11-12.
36. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44808 (West 1978). See notes 26-28 & accompanying text
supra.
37. Brief of Appellants at 11-15.
38. Id. at 28-34.
39. Id. at 24; Appellant's Reply Brief at 40. Persons with supervisory responsibilities
must anticipate that young children are more likely to engage in mischief than adults. Ray-
mond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 10, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 853 (1963).
High school students, however, are more capable of self control than grammar school stu-
dents and consequently less supervision may be required. Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 748, 470 P.2d 360, 364, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 380 (1970).
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The School District's Response
Bolstered by the amicus curiae voice of thirty-seven school and
community college districts, 40 Manhattan Beach City School District
entreated the supreme court to uphold dismissal of the Hoyems' com-
plaint on both legal and policy grounds.
Arguing against a duty to prevent students from leaving campus,
the district stressed both the importance of the situs of the injury and
the status of the victim. It asserted that the off-campus situs of the in-
jury relieved it of a duty, Michael having voluntarily left the campus
and there having been no subsequent undertaking by the district to
protect or to provide transportation for him.41 A contrary rule would
burden schools with a limitless duty to ensure student safety along the
varied routes children travel to and from school.42 To underscore
Michael's truant status, the district emphasized case law precluding lia-
bility for off-campus injuries arising from non-school-related activi-
ties.43 Because truancy is by definition a voluntary activity
unconnected to any school purpose, the district argued it was absolved
from liability.44
The policy arguments offered against the imposition of liability
had a common and effusive theme: an adverse ruling would force
schools to implement new procedures and policies which would detri-
mentally effect quality of education in California. For example, the
district and the amicus curiae insisted that public schools would have to
be made physically "truant proof' 45 and that the burden of such an
undertaking would be staggering. They contended that the traditional
role and duty of staff members would be diverted from teaching to
guarding and monitoring.46 They also predicted that the impossibility
of maintaining visual contact with all students would require a reduc-
tion in the size of campuses, destroying students' sense of freedom and
openness. 47 It was further argued that many unique educational pro-
grams which require students to move within or leave the campus dur-
ing the school day could never be adequately "truant-proofed" and
would therefore have to be eliminated.48 Additionally, the district
40. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 2-3. The brief of the amicus curiae was filed by the
County Counsel of Los Angeles County.
41. Opposition to Petition For Hearing at 3-4 (citing Kerwin v. County of San Mateo,
176 Cal. App. 304, 1 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1959)). See notes 23-28 & accompanying text supra.
42. Opposition to Petition For Hearing at 7 (citing Girard v. Monrovia City School
Dist., 121 Cal. App. 2d 737, 743, 264 P.2d 115, 119 (1953)).
43. See note 25 & accompanying text supra.
44. Opposition to Petition for Hearing at 4.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Id.
47. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 6-8.
48. Id. at 12. It was noted in the amicus curiae brief that students in junior and senior
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maintained that because truancy is not one of the statutory bases for
student suspension, schools would be saddled with the frustrating re-
sponsibility of protecting persons over whom they have no effective
control. 49
As an alternative to "truant-proofing," the district argued, some
schools would be forced to purchase insurance covering truants. They
further submitted that pursuance of this alternative would precipitate a
liability insurance crisis at a time when not only are schools facing un-
precedented financial strains, but governmental entities are finding it
increasingly difficult to procure adequate insurance protection at any
price5()
The Hoyem Decision: Liability May Incur for Injuries to Truants
In a majority opinion written by Justice Tobriner, a divided court
ruled that the duty to supervise school grounds includes the obligation
to exercise due care to ensure that students do not leave without per-
mission during the school day.5' Justice Tobriner relied on Dailey v.
Los Angeles Unifted School District,52 a case arising out of an injury
sustained during a student fist fight on school premises and which fell
squarely within the law of school ground supervision. The plaintiffs in
both Dailey and Hoyem had alleged that the duty to provide reason-
able supervision on campus had been breached.5 3 The Dailev court
ruled that supervisorial duties included the duty to enforce any rules or
regulations necessary for pupil safety.5 4 The Hoyem court found such
a regulation in a section of the California Administrative Code55
prohibiting unauthorized student departures prior to termination of the
school day. Justice Tobriner had "no doubt that this rule is at least in
part for the pupils' protection, and that the school authorities therefore
high schools traditionally, and elementary level students increasingly, move within the cam-
pus from one class to the next during the school day. Also allegedly threatened were voca-
tional training programs that require students to leave school for a portion of the day to
attend occupational classes. Id.
49. Id. at 8. Truancy is not among those offenses for which a pupil in a California
public school can be suspended or expelled. CAL. EDuc. CODF § 48900 (West 1978).
50. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 15. The amicus brief cited to "A Report of the Liability
and Property Insurance Crises in Los Angeles Public School Districts" published by the
County Superintendent's Office in August 1977. This report allegedly chronicles a crisis in
the insurance business caused by the alarming underwriting losses for liability lines. As a
result companies were attempting to eliminate all political entities from their books partly
through a three year premium increase of 400%. Id. at 16.
51. 22 Cal. 3d at 514, 585 P.2d at 854, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
52. 2 Cal. 3d 741, 470 P.2d 360, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1970).
53. 22 Cal. 3d at 513-14, 585 P.2d at 854, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 4. See notes 32-33 & accom-
panying text supra.
54. 2 Cal. 3d at 747, 470 P.2d at 363, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
55. Tit. 5, CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 303 (1977).
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bore the duty to exercise ordinary care to enforce the rule." 56
In examining the relevance of the situs of the injury, Justice Tobri-
ner branded as "misplaced" the district's contention that the mere fact
of an off-campus situs barred recovery.57 He noted that in a previous
California decision, Satariano v. Sleight,58 the court had recognized the
claim of a student injured while crossing a public street located be-
tween the school gymnasium and the athletic field. Satariano illus-
trated that situs in itself was insufficient to defeat recovery because in
some circumstances school authorities must supervise students who are
off school premises.5 9 He reasoned further, however, that because the
present allegations concerned a duty owed to the plaintiff while he was
on school premises, this case was not the occasion on which to deter-
mine the scope of the off-campus duty recognized in Satarano.60 Ac-
cording to Justice Tobriner, the duty found in Hoyem was not a new
duty, nor was it an extension of the Dailey rule; the court was simply
reaffirming an obligation of due care owed while students are on school
grounds.61 This duty, Justice Tobriner reasoned, was applicable to stu-
dents who, although voluntarily enrolled in summer sessions, were
compelled to attend classes. 62 Moreover, this duty was held not to be
obviated during the summer, Justice Tobriner reasoning that parents
"can legitimately expect adequate supervision" 63 during school hours.
The Hoyem opinion did concede that by enacting section 44808 of
the Education Code the legislature had intended to limit school respon-
sibility for the safety of pupils when not on school property.64 Justice
Tobriner noted, however, that the statute's terms and legislative history
evidenced an intention not to apply its limitation on duty to the instant
facts. While the statute generally absolves the school of off-campus lia-
bility, it withdraws this protection where the school "has failed to exer-
cise reasonable care under the circumstances. ' 65 He emphasized that
the Hoyems had brought themselves within this exception by alleging
the lack of reasonable supervision to prevent unauthorized student de-
56. 22 Cal. 3d at 514, 585 P.2d at 854, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
57. Id. at 515, 585 P.2d at 855, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
58. 54 Cal. App. 2d 278, 129 P.2d 35 (1942).
59. 22 Cal. 3d at 515, 585 P.2d at 855, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 515-16, 585 P.2d at 855, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 5. To further support the finding
that truants may recover for negligent supervision Justice Tobriner cited Bryant v. United
States, 565 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1977), in which federal authorities running a boarding school
were held liable for negligently failing to prevent three students from leaving school grounds
without permission during a severe snowstorm.
62. 22 Cal. 3d at 519, 585 P.2d at 857, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
63. Id. at 519-20, 585 P.2d at 857, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
64. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48808 (West 1978). See notes 25-27 & accompanying text
supra.
65. 22 Cal. 3d at 517, 585 P.2d at 856, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
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partures. 66 Because the statute is based upon problems of the duty
owed to students travelling to and from school before or after school
hours67 or who are engaging in school-related activities off school prop-
erty, 68 he found that it in no way restricts the school district's duty to
supervise students on school premises during school hours.69
In rejecting the policy arguments advanced by the defendant and
amicus districts, Justice Tobriner described their fears as "clearly un-
warranted. ' 70 The majority findings required "ordinary care not for-
tresses; schools must be reasonably supervised, not truant-proof."7'
Justice Tobriner suggested, however, that a jury could still reduce an
injured truant's award under principles of comparative negligence.72
Finally, in ruling that the question of proximate cause was a jury
question, Justice Tobriner held that Michael Hoyem's departure was
not unforeseeable as a matter of law:
Since at least the days of Huck Finn and Tom Sawyer, however,
adults have been well aware that children are often tempted to
wander off from school, and a jury might well conclude that the de-
fendants could have reasonably foreseen that this temptation might
be especially strong in the summer session when a student's friends
might not be in school. Indeed, the duty to supervise school children
is imposed in large part in recognition of the fact that, without such
supervision, students will not always conduct themselves in accord-
ance with school rules or as safely as they ought to.7 3
He concluded that the mere involvement of the negligent motorist was
not in itself sufficient to absolve the district of liability once it was
shown that it was negligent in discharging its supervisorial duties.7 4
Justice Clark in dissent accused the majority of making a political
decision to set up school districts as absolute insurers of truant safety. 75
These sentiments reflected those espoused by the defendant and amicus
school districts.76 He charged that the alternatives presented to the
66. Id.
67. Kerwin v. County of San Mateo, 176 Cal. App. 2d 304, 1 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1959);
Girard v. Monrovia City School Dist., 121 Cal. App. 2d 737, 264 P.2d 115 (1953).
68. Castro v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 54 Cal. App. 3d 232, 126 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1976).
69. 22 Cal. 3d at 518 n.3, 585 P.2d at 857, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
70. Id. at 519, 585 P.2d at 857, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 519 n.4, 585 P.2d at 857, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
73. Id. at 520, 585 P.2d at 858, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
74. Id. at 521, 585 P.2d at 858, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
75. Justice Clark accused the majority of "paying only lip service" to the rule estab-
lished in Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 12 Cal. 2d 310, 317, 83 P.2d 948, 951 (1938), that
public school districts are not the insurers of pupil safety. Later he was less suggestive and
more explicit: "[tlhere is little question the majority decision is grounded on a policy deter-
mination that, in their view, yet another element of society should be afforded an insured's
protection against mishap." 22 Cal. 3d at 525, 585 P.2d at 861, 150 Cal. Rptr. at I1.
76. See notes 45-50 & accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 30
school districts, increased security in an attempt to "truant-proof' or
the purchase of more insurance, would either send the districts into
bankruptcy 77 or create a "concentration camp"-like atmosphere inimi-
cal to students' interest in quality education. 78 He concluded that the
unforeseeability of the injury, the remote connection between injury
and negligence, the lack of any moral blame for the school in its at-
tempt to fulfill its educational role and the potential of insurmountable
financial burdens should have compelled the exercise of restraint in im-
posing liability.79
Justice Richardson concurred in Justice Clark's dissent, also
phrasing the duty issue as ultimately a policy determination. 80 Among
the factors he found favoring the district were the "fundamental" role
of education, the inevitable risk truancy presents to school operations,
the financial burden of insuring against this "new" liability, and the
lack of any moral culpability.8' Justice Richardson also criticized the
majority for failing to define clearly the scope of a school district's duty
to supervise, suggesting the next case may involve a "truant who with-
out anyone's permission or knowledge deliberately slipped away from
school, hopped a freight train and was injured when he fell off a car
four days later in Duluth, Minnesota. '8 2 He argued that when the stu-
dent leaves the schoolyard on a "lark" the school's liability should not,
"like a shadow, follow the youngster as he wanders around town. '8 3
Such a limitation, he asserted, had been intended by the legislature
when it enacted section 44808 of the Education Code.84
Hoyem and the Modern Concept of Duty
The majority denied that its decision extended previously existing
law or created a new definition of duty. Rather, it emphasized that the
court had merely reaffirmed a recognized obligation of due care.8 5
These statements, however, do little to conceal the fundamental role
that the modem concept of duty demanded in Hoyem. The liability of
school districts for injuries to truants presented a question novel to Cal-
ifornia tort law. The issue engendered considerable debate over the
77. A result which he argued would be hastened by the adoption of Proposition 13, a
ballot initiative reducing state property taxes and thereby limiting state revenue sources, in
the 1978 state primary election. 22 Cal. 3d at 524-25, 585 P.2d at 861, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
See notes 166-67 & accompanying text infra.
78. 22 Cal. 3d at 525, 585 P.2d at 861, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
79. Id. at 526-27, 585 P.2d at 862, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
80. Id. at 527, 585 P.2d at 862, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
81. Id. at 527, 585 P.2d at 863, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
82. Id. at 528, 585 P.2d at 863, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See notes 61-63 & accompanying text supra.
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relevance of victim status and injury situs, the implications that a find-
ing of liability would have on broad interests, and the efficacy of judi-
cial attempts to resolve such problems. These issues are at the heart of
the modem approach to duty and were central to the Hoyem decision.
The remainder of this Note examines the trend in modem tort law to
expand and simplify the concept of duty in an attempt to permit the
jury to decide most issues of liability. The factors influencing the
Hoyem court to adhere to or depart from this trend are identified. This
section concludes that the problems of truancy and negligent supervi-
sion defy rational adjudication and that, therefore, the California
Supreme Court should have retreated from its trends of expansion and
simplication by establishing a rule of limited duty, thus delegating the
issue of the need for a more extensive duty to the legislature.
The Evolving Concept of Duty in Modern Tort Law
A "duty" is a legally-imposed obligation arising by virtue of some
relationship between two parties requiring one party to conform to a
standard of care for the benefit or protection of the other. 86 The rules
of duty, in the common law tradition, are primarily judge-made 87 and
generally reflect the social and political environment existing at the
time of any decision. 88 Over the last century duty has been dramati-
cally influenced by the environment and has undergone a shift from a
complex doctrine to a simplified ideal. During the nineteenth century,
duty was a mechanistic concept developed to restrict the number of
causes of action available to an injured plaintiff.89 This approach was
part of a broader trend toward easing the adjudicability of complex
claims and minimizing the number of worker's suits brought during the
early years of the industrial revolution. 90 In keeping with the period's
new awareness of individual "free will," this limitation on duty ensured
that liability would be imposed only where there was legal "fault" and
provided citizens with an incentive to ensure their own safety.9' Even
86. J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 44 (1967); F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1015-24 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 324-26 (4th
ed. 1971); Seavy, Princiles of Torts, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5-6, (1964).
87. See Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, Part I: The Influence of Environment, 64 W.
VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1961); Horvitz, Justice Tobriner's Tort Decisions: A Re-Affirmation of the
Common Law Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 167 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Horvitz].
88. See Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, Part P" The Influence of Environment, 64 W.
VA. L. REV. 1 (1961); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS xxvii (1956).
89. Tobriner, The Changing Concept of Duty in the Law of Torts, CAL. TRIAL LAW. J.,
Winter/Spring, 1970, at 17, 18 [hereinafter cited as Tobriner].
90. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734-35, 441 P.2d 912, 916-17, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
76-77 (1968); Sulnick, A Political Perspective of Tort Law, 7 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 410, 415
(1974); Tobriner, supra note 89, at 18.
91. The development of fault as a coextensive element of duty reflected this period's
emphasis on individualism. The new political liberalism fostered this value on free will in
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if a duty were found to exist, negligence actions were still subject to the
restrictive and subtle refinements of contributory negligence, last clear
chance, assumption of the risk, and the fellow-servant rule. 92 More-
over, judicial determinations of liability not only relied heavily upon
such restrictive doctrine,93 but rarely addressed underlying issues of so-
cial policy.94
Modem courts, however, recognizing the increased complexity,
collectivization, and risk of injury in today's society,95 have begun to
openly infuse socio-economic considerations into the concept of duty,
attempting to achieve a delicate balance of broad values.96 While
judges in the past weighed social policies when drawing the line be-
tween liability and nonliability,97 judges today are more willing to
openly announce that their task is inherently political9" and that social
an attempt to rely less upon the hierarchical character of relationships which pervaded me-
dieval society and more upon mobility and individual initiative both in politics and in the
marketplace. See W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 119-20, 161-63 (2d ed.
1972). See generally Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. REV. 564, 564-65 (1952);
Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial
State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247, 1249-51 (1967).
"The emergence of 'fault' as the principal basis of tort liability during the nineteenth
century may be seen as part of the broader legal development which Sir Henry Maine char-
acterized as a 'movementfrom Status to Contract.'" Rintala, The Supreme Court of Calfor-
nia, 1968-1969-Foreward "Status" Concepts in the Law of Torts, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 80, 80
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Rintala]. Contract, like the new concept of negligence, signified
unfettered choice. It focused not on relationships, hierarchies or status, but on the implica-
tions of individual action and provided legal redress only when a performance or duty was
owed. Id. at 83-94.
92. See J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 138-41, 143-47 (1967); 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1191-92, 1197-99 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF TORTS 418 (4th ed. 1971).
93. See, e.g., Rintala, supra note 91.
94. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 762 (1956) (assumption that
plaintiff and defendant alone were involved "focused attention on the moral quality of the
conduct of the individual partcipants in the accident"); ef. Cooperrider, 4 Comment on the
Law of Torts, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1291, 1311 (1958): "The judges of an earlier day were
modest in the claims they were willing to make for the law of torts. They did not conceive
that it was their mission to sally forth to remedy all the ills of society armed only with the
money judgment. There were areas of conflict between persons where, by reason of the
limitations of their techniques, they frankly feared to tread, recognizing the danger that their
interference, in the long run and in the generality of cases, would work more harm than
good. [To do justice according to law between plaintiff and defendant, they worked out a
system of checks and balances between judge and jury so that that objective could at least be
approached."
95. Horvitz, supra note 87, at 167-68 (citing several articles written by Justice Tobri-
ner). See also J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 187-205 (3d ed. rev. 1978).
96. Tobriner, supra note 89, at 22.
97. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 258
(1929). See also Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76
(1928).
98. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 446-47, 563 P.2d 858,
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factors will predominate in their decision making.99
Three identifiable groups of authorities have commented upon this
new expression of duty. 100 Generally, they may be categorized by their
emphasis on (1) social values, (2) economic theory, or (3) political con-
flict as providing the basis for a finding of liability.
Most writers have noted a decided shift to a "victim-oriented" ap-
proach concerned primarily with compensating the plaintiff which in
turn reduces the emphasis placed upon the fault of the defendant.' 0 '
This trend is due to the recognition that in the past the law too often
distinguished between compensable and noncompensable injuries on
the basis of intricate and overly specific doctrines of duty, whereas in
terms of social cost the injuries of all victims are measured by the same
standard. 10 2 Thus, the courts have developed a distaste for fixed rules
of duty that prevent a jury from deciding a case, 10 3 preferring a more
general standard of care that affords a case-by-case approach to the
problem of compensation.'°4 As a corollary to emphasis on the victim's
injury, the importance of the plaintiff's "reasonable expectation" of
safety has been stressed. 05 This emphasis on expectation arises out of
a policy determination: the public has a right to expect a certain per-
formance or standard of conduct from a defendant because of the de-
862, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977) (Tobriner, J.) (quoting from Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal.
App. 3d 744, 746, 120 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111 (1975)).
99. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 15 (4th ed. 1971). See Raymond v. Paradise
Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8-9, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851-52 (1963).
100. See Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept. Retreat from the Rule ofLaw,
51 IND. L.J. 467, 522-23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Henderson].
101. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 815 (1967):
Horvitz, supra note 87, at 168-71; Rabin, Some Thoughts on Tort Law from a Sociopolitical
Perspective, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 51, 68-70. But cf. Green, The Thrust of Tort Lag, Part I- The
Influence of Environment, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1961) (goal of recompense has always
been central tenet of tort law). The fault concept has been described as a "legal lottery" of
complex rules into which innocent victims are thrust, unable to proceed with the assurance
that their case will not be dismissed because of fixed rules of law. Franklin, Replacing the
Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774. 785-87
(1967).
102. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimburse-
ment, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 774 (1967).
103. Id. at 786.
104. See generaly James, Indemnity, Subrogation, and Contribution and the Efficient Dis-
tribution of Accident Losses, 21 AM. TRIAL LAW. L.J. 360, 360-61 (1958). Professor Cooper-
rider, a critic of this change, has identified in addition to the pressures for increased
compensation, an "aesthetic urge" in modem tort law to reorganize specific rules of duty in
accordance with the broad generalizations of "reasonableness" and "'foreseeability."
Cooperrider, Comment on The Law of Torts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 1291. 1309-10 (1958). Simi-
larly, Professor Henderson has described the repugnance among courts and scholars toward
formality in doctrine as a reflection of a trend of "purification" of the negligence concept.
Henderson, supra note 100, at 483, 501.
105. Horvitz, supra note 87, at 170; Tobriner, supra note 89 at 18, 22.
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fendant's status as, for example, a landlord, manufacturer, or driver of
an automobile.10 6
Another group of scholars emphasizes economic theory as the pri-
mary basis for apportioning liability. 10 7 This approach may stress the
importance of reaching acceptable accident-safety levels or efficient
loss minimization,'0 s or it may focus on the defendant's ability to ab-
sorb and spread the risk of loss arising from its activities. 109
A third group of commentators, a decided minority, sees the ex-
panding notion of duty as a political tool. One writer, for instance,
argues that expanding the number of causes of action and increasing
the size of the class of plaintiffs do not illustrate an effort toward effi-
cient loss allocation and compensation, but signify only an attempt to
control and frustrate institutional behavior. 10 Similarly, others con-
tend that the new flexibility can be manipulated to ensure that those
who are entrusted with power act "in a civilized manner."'II
These various approaches to the question of duty may not always
be categorized as distinctly as the above groupings would indicate.
Most writers agree that the process of incorporating policy considera-
tions into duty has led to a more flexible concept that enables courts to
weigh a blend of socio-economic interests."12
106. Tobriner, supra note 89 at 18-21. See generally Rintala, supra note 91.
107. The foremost proponent of economic analysis has been Professor Calabresi. His
most significant and well-known contribution is G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
(1970).
108. See, e.g., Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
109. The actual theories are more complicated. Professor Calabresi theorizes that fewer
social costs would imbue society if the wealthy were to pay a greater share of the accident
price. Arguing that the principal functions of negligence law are compensation and reallo-
cation of accident cost, he suggests that problems of cost avoidance should be treated in
terms of activities rather than in terms of fault or careless conduct. His focus, however, is
primarily upon cost reallocation; he urges that activities which cause accidents should not be
abolished but should be required to more nearly reflect their social costs. To implement
these theories he proposes that activities which are valueless should be subject to non-insura-
ble tort fines; on the other hand, activities which have a social value should be allowed to
operate to the extent they can pay for their accident costs. Calabresi, The Decision for Acci-
dents.'An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713-20, 742-45
(1965). See also Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1422 (1966).
110. Sulnick, 4 Political Perspective of Tort Law, 7 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 410, 415-17
(1974). According to Sulneck, the role of tort law is to control institutional behavior and to
provide the catalyst for policy changes. This function is effectuated by forcing institutions to
pay out damage awards and by "stigmatizing" their behavior as "unlawful" through media
coverage of injury suits. Id. at 417-22.
111. See Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts. Vistasfor the 70s, 22 STAN. L. REV. 330,
335 (1970).
112. Most writers commenting upon this flexibility simply refer to the broadening of
liability which has resulted from a weighing of policy. They do not explicitly single out
"duty" as the focal point of change in modem tort law. See, e.g., Green, The Thrust of Tort
Law, Part .[ The Influence of Environment, 64 WEST VA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1961). See also W.
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This mixed emphasis is evident in the well-known California
Supreme Court decisions of Dillon v. Legg,113 Vesely v. Sager"14 and
Rowland v. Christian.'1 5 These cases are relevant here for another rea-
son: each, much like Hoyem, considered arguments by a defendant that
the situs of the injury and the status of the victim as a matter of law
either precluded or severely limited the duty owed to the plaintiff. The
justices in response established the predominate trend in modern Cali-
fornia tort law by rejecting these contentions as overly rigid and apply-
ing a simplified rule of duty to effectuate the social and economic goals
of victim compensation, efficient loss minimization and allocation, and
increased responsibility for defendants.
In Dillon the majority per Justice Tobriner established a cause of
action for emotional shock and resulting physical injury on behalf of a
mother who, although outside the "zone of danger" and not suffering a
physical impact, witnessed the defendant driver negligently strike and
kill her child." 6 The majority discarded the common law rule that in-
jury situs precluded duty, charactierizing it as an "immunizing," overly
complex concept designed solely to defeat claims. Dillon thus estab-
lished that the two crucial elements of duty are foreseeability and the
plaintiffs expectation of safety." 7 The case is also "victim-oriented" in
its emphasis on compensation of injury as a significant goal of tort
law.' 8 This view is evidenced in the court's emphasis on the nature of
the plaintiffs injury and the community values favoring her
recovery. "19
In a subsequent decision, Vesely v. Sager, 20 the California court
imposed liability on a bar owner who provided alcohol to a patron who
later caused injury to a third person. Chief Justice Wright abrogated
the common law rule, based upon victim status, that the owner of a
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 16-23 (4th ed. 1971); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS 742-43 (1956); Rabin, Some Thoughts on Tort Law From a Sociopolitical Perspective.
1969 Wis. L. REV. 51, 62. Nevertheless, the factors which they emphasize as providing the
impetus for the expansion of negligence are exactly those which the California Supreme
Court analyzed in determining new questions of duty. See, e.g., Weirum v. RKO General,
Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d
108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
113. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
114. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
115. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
116. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
117. Id. at 734-36, 739-40, 441 P.2d at 916-17, 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77, 79-80;
Horvitz, supra note 95, at 169-70.
118. See Horvitz, supra note 87, at 169-70.
119. 68 Cal. 2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74. See also Weirum v. RKO
General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (1975) (foreseeabil-
ity, history, community morals, justice and convenience influence a finding of duty).
120. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
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liquor-serving establishment could not be liable to such third persons
as a matter of law.' 2' The holding in Vesely was based explicitly upon
the superior ability of the defendant to evaluate the dangerousness of
the situation and to prevent injury, 122 thus enabling loss minimization,
and implicitly upon the defendant owner's ability to spread the risk of
injury. 23
Neither Dillon nor Vesely surpassed Rowland v. Chrislian124 in
providing a comprehensive modem treatment of the problem of duty.
Rowland, decided in the same year as Dillon, is a classic illustration of
how the court has made duty more flexible and simplified in the face of
restrictive situs and status doctrines. Justice Peters led the court in con-
cluding that the common law classifications of persons coming upon
land as trespassers, licensees, or invitees were a "semantic morass" of
confused and conflicting doctrines,' 25 unjustified in a modem society
that placed great value upon "limb and life." These fixed designations
were discarded in favor of a single rule of reasonable care toward all
persons coming upon land.' 26 Justice Peters listed several factors that
could be considered in determining the question of duty:127 foreseeabil-
121. 5 Cal. 3d at 159-64, 486 P.2d at 155-59, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 627-3 1. The common law
doctrine held that furnishing alcoholic beverages was not the proximate cause of the third
party's injuries; the supreme court, however, observed that the issue in Vesely was not one of
proximate cause but rather one of duty. Id.
122. Horvitz, supra note 87, at 174.
123. Horvitz, supra note 87, at 174. Later, in Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144,
577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978), the tavern-owner liability established in Vesely was
extended to social hosts or non-commercial entities who furnish alcoholic beverages to in-
toxicated persons under circumstances that create a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to
others. The fact that Coulter imposed liability on a non-commercial defendant does not,
however, diminish the relevance that a defendant's risk-spreading ability commands in de-
ciding the question of duty. In Coulter, Justice Richardson applied the Rowland elements of
duty and assumed that liability insurance would be available to protect social hosts. He also
recognized that the burden on a non-commercial defendant would be significant; however,
in balancing this burden against the nature of the injury he concluded that the latter, be-
cause of the potential for serious harm, deserved more weight. Id. at 153-54, 577 P.2d at
674-75, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539-40. The California Legislature has abrogated the holdings in
Veseiy and Coulter by providing that furnishers of alcohol shall not be liable for the negli-
gent acts of intoxicated persons whom they have served. 1978 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 929.
(amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25602, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714).
124. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
125. Id. at 116, 443 P.2d at 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 102 (quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1959)).
126. Id. at 118-19, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. The essence of the decision in
Rowland lies in its recognition that the common law rules based upon the status of the
victim "obscured" the value that is placed upon human safety and prevented courts from
compensating injury. See id. at 118, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
127. Id. at 113, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. Justice Peters noted that this
balancing should be engaged in to determine if there is some public policy "clearly" sup-
porting a departure from the general rule that all persons owe a duty of reasonable care to
prevent others from being injured. Id.
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ity of injury; the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered harm; the
moral culpability of the defendant; the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injury; the policy of preventing
future harm; the burden on the defendant and the community; and the
availability of insurance. The analytical relationship among these ele-
ments was left unclear by the Rowland court, and no subsequent deci-
sion has attempted to order them in terms of proper weight or value. 2 8
This ambiguity was probably intentional; the justices' purpose being
only to illuminate some of the components of duty. 2 9 As a result,
courts are free in future decisions to fashion a balance appropriate for
the social and economic context of each case. 130
The central themes arising from these cases are important to delin-
eate so that the trend preceding Hoyem may be understood. Generally
the court has become more confident in its ability to adjudicate diverse
claims by expanding and simplifying duty. Consequently, increasingly
heavier burdens are imposed on defendants. The predominant tool of
analysis has been a balancing of disparate policy considerations on a
case-by-case approach, the court seeking a unified rule of potential lia-
bility for nearly any harm caused by unreasonable conduct. 131 The two
major determinants of "unreasonableness" are foreseeability and the
plaintiffs expectation that the defendant will act with ordinary care. 132
Exactly what will give content to an injured party's expectations in a
particular case is not clear. Rowland133 sketches an outline that may be
filled in on an ad hoc basis dependent upon the type of activity in
which the defendant engages, the ability to prevent harm, and the ca-
pacity to absorb loss. 134 The trend toward providing compensation for
a greater variety of injuries and toward finding more efficient methods
of loss-allocation also has played a significant role. 135
The most important theme to note is that the pressures exerted by
the goals of a single rule of reasonableness, adequacy in compensation,
efficient loss-allocation, prevention of injury and increased responsibil-
ity placed upon defendants apparently have made the California court
uncomfortable with fixed rules of duty such as those based upon victim
status and injury situs. As a result, where the opportunity has been
128. CALIFORNIA CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON TORT REFORM, RIGHTING THE LIABILITY
BALANCE 58-59 (1977).
129. Id.
130. Id.; Tobriner, supra note 89, at 22.
131. See Tobriner, supra note 89; notes 113-130 & accompanying text.
132. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1018 (1956); Tobriner, supra note 89
at 17, 22: Horvitz, supra note 87, at 168, 170.
133. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). See
notes 124-30 & accompanying text supra.
134. See notes 105-06, 107-09, 120-23 & accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 101-04, 107-09, 116-19 & accompanying text supra.
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presented, specificity in negligence doctrine has been abrogated or re-
jected as claim defeating and anachronistic 36 so that the trier of fact
may decide the case guided by the broad principle of reasonableness.
Hoyem and the Duty Balance
Hoyem is consistent with the California Supreme Court's trend to-
ward simplification and expansion of the concept of duty. The school
district attempted to counter this trend by stressing that Michael was
truant and that the injury occurred off-campus. The court rejected
these issues as irrelevant 37 and thus reaffirmed its dissatisfaction with
specificity in negligence doctrine. A number of other factors, some of
which were not explicitly discussed by Justice Tobriner, probably led
the majority toward this stance: foreseeability, the expectations of par-
ents, the nature of the district's position in society as the employer of
educators and supervisors of young children, the overriding goals of
compensation for a wider variety of injuries and effective loss preven-
tion, and the trend toward imposing heavier obligations upon defend-
ants. The pressures exerted by these factors resulted in rejection of the
fixed doctrine offered by the school district and the embracing of a
principle of reasonable supervision determined on a case-by-case basis.
Hoyem, therefore, is consistent with the trend in California tort
law. The decision embodies the search for a simplified approach to
duty in the form of a unified rule of liability. Moreover, notwithstand-
ing the issue of adjudicability raised by the dissenting justices,138 the
trier of fact was delegated the task of resolving the question of liability,
guided only by the undefinable criterion of reasonableness.1 39
Application of the modern concept of duty in this manner to the
problem of truancy and schoolyard supervision constitutes a simplistic
approach to a complex problem. The question of school district liabil-
ity for truant injuries presents complicated problems involving broad
policy questions. The remainder of this section examines the Hoyem
"duty balance", a weighing of disparate factors common to the modern
approach to duty. The purpose is twofold: illustration of the limitless
and entangling nature of the truancy issue in Hoyem and expansion
upon the factors influencing the supreme court to follow or depart from
136. The supreme court found the common law doctrine rejected in Dillon, Rowland and
Vesely to be outmoded in light of modem needs. See notes 113-130 & accompanying text
supra. Other California supreme court decisions have similarily eroded and labeled com-
mon law doctrine as anachronistic. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648,
92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (minor's negligence action against parent); Muskopf v. Coming
Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (governmental immunity
from tort liability).
137. See notes 57-60 & accompanying text supra.
138. See note 75 & accompanying text supra.
139. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
July 1979] INJURIES TO TRUANTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
its trend in deciding duty questions. The factors that swayed the court
to adhere to its trend of simplification and expansion are considered
first. These include expectations of safety, ability to prevent harm, ju-
dicial desire for theoretical consistency, workability of a rule of liabil-
ity, and the unique societal role of schools.
Parental expectations regarding the measures that school authori-
ties should take to ensure the safety of children delivered to their care
played a key role in Hoyem. Parents entrust school authorities with
their children expecting that the school will exercise the degree of care
compatible with the abilities and experience of young children. 40 In
fact, Justice Tobriner noted that parents who enroll their children in
school can "legitimately expect adequate supervision."' 14' This trust is
an aspect of the traditional obligation of schools to both protect chil-
dren and to instruct them on principles of safe conduct. 42 Today as
many urban schools experience increased enrollment, this obligation
has become even more essential. The courts of New York, for example,
have spoken of the "high standard of supervision and care. . .[which]
should be imposed upon principals and teachers. Parents do not send
their children to school to be returned to them maimed because of the
absence of the proper supervision or the abandonment of
supervision." 143
The superior ability of the school authorities, much like the driver
of the car, the landowner, and the bar owner in Rowland, Dillon and
Vesely, to evaluate the dangers, and to prevent the plaintiff's injuries
and thus enable loss minimization also figured significantly in Hoyem's
continuation of the duty trend. 44 The district was in superior position
to stop Michael Hoyem from departing on his summer lark, to foresee
dangers on nearby streets, and to determine the necessity for and extent
of supervision. Moreover, when Michael arrived at school they were
responsible to meet a duty of care to protect his physical safety.
A third reason the court continued its trend toward a broad role of
reasonableness was a desire for theoretical consistency. 45 The district's
assertion that duty ceased as a matter of law once Michael left the
schoolyard 46 could be described as a step backward in this trend,
which if extended to its logical extreme would impede a "victim-ori-
ented" approach to the problem of compensation and might reduce in-
centive to prevent loss. For example, under this rule the district would
140. See, e.g., Satariano v. Sleight, 54 Cal. App. 2d 278, 284, 129 P.2d 35, 39 (1942).
141. 22 Cal. 3d at 519, 585 P.2d at 857, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
142. For a codification of this principle see CAL. EDUC. COoE § 44807 (West 1978).
143. Feuerstein v. Board of Educ., 202 N.Y.S.2d 524, 528 (1960).
144. Horvitz, supra note 95, at 171-74. See notes 113-30 & accompanying text supra.
145. See note 136 & accompanying text supra.
146. See notes 41-44 & accompanying text supra.
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be relieved of liability even if a supervisor made no effort to prevent a
pupil from running off the grounds and into the path of an oncoming
car. To limit duty in this manner would only return to the approach
taken prior to Dillon and would base duty upon geography rather than
foreseeability and other factual determinations. 47 These considera-
tions demonstrate that the Ioyem court may have accorded little
weight to the district's argument because of its anachronistic
appearance.
The seeming workability of the reasonable supervision standard 48
also apparently encouraged the court to continue previous trends in the
definition of duty. The rule does not impose upon a school district the
role of an absolute insurer of student safety. In theory at least, reason-
able supervision does not require truant-proofing. The-degree of care
that will discharge the duty of supervision depends upon the circum-
stances. In some instances, a simple warning based upon the recogni-
tion that students are apt to foresake self-protective measures would
suffice to discharge the duty.' 49 The age of the particular student
would be a relevant consideration. High school students, for example,
because of their relative maturity and alleged ability to recognize dan-
ger would require less supervision than elementary students. 50 On
other occasions, when school authorities have knowledge of a particu-
lar student's weaknesses, greater care would be required. 51
A striking reason why the court tipped the balance in Hoyem to-
ward a continued expansion and simplification of duty is perhaps
found in the court's emphasis on obligations imposed upon defendants
by virtue of their "status" in society.' 52 The traditional role of schools
has broadened recently, society now places greater value upon educa-
tion.' 53 Local schools are increasingly perceived as institutions that
must assume enhanced responsibility. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the obligation of schools to conform to accepted concepts of justice
recently has been tested repeatedly. 54 Judicial inquiry has focused on
147. See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
148. Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8-9, 31 Cal. Rptr.
847, 851-52 (1963).
149. See e.g., Satariano v. Sleight, 54 Cal. App. 2d 278, 284, 129 P.2d 35, 39 (1942).
150. See e.g., Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 748, 470 P.2d
360, 364, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 380 (1970).
151. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 157 Cal. App. 2d 842, 322
P.2d 70 (1958).
152. See notes 105-06, 133-34 & accompanying text supra.
153. Shannon, The New Tactics Used by Plaintiffs in Imposing Their Views on, or Enforc-
ing Their Rights Against, Public School Boards-A Commentary, 2 J. L. & EDuC. 77, 78
(1973).
154. "Few of our institutions, if any, have aroused the controversies, or incurred the
public dissatisfaction, which have attended the operation of the public schools during the
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nearly every aspect of school administration including race and deseg-
regation,155 constitutional rights of students156 and school personnel, 157
methods of financing,158 and educational malpractice. 59 This judicial
involvement demonstrates that most courts acknowledge the philoso-
phy that schools should be required to respond, both in the classroom
on the playground, in a fashion commensurate with their position as
institutions that must answer to modern expectations.160
While the above factors present a possible basis upon which the
court would continue the modern trend of expanding and simplifying
the concept of duty, the considerations that support a retreat from the
trend are more persuasive. This opposing view emphasizes the undesir-
ability of imposing economic burdens upon schools, the nature of tru-
ancy, the difficulty of distinguishing fairly and consistently among the
claims of truants and other students, and the effect that uncertainty in
risk calculation could have on insurance coverage. These arguments
implicitly suggest that Hoyem raised issues of great complexity, the res-
olution of which may have a substantial impact on education in
California. 161
The economic impact of imposing liability in Hoyem may be the
most compelling reason for adopting a limited rule of duty. One of the
essential aspects of the modern concept of duty is the superior ability of
the defendant to bear and spread the risk of loss stemming from inju-
ries caused by the activity performed or services rendered. 162 This no-
tion necessarily assumes, however, that the party required to shoulder
this burden is engaged in business-for-profit. 63 Educational institu-
last few decades. Rightly or wrongly, but widely, they are charged with outright failure in
the achievement of their educational objectives; according to some critics, they bear respon-
sibility for many of the social and moral problems of our society at large." Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (1976). See
also Chu, Political Efficacy. The Problems of Money, Race and Control in the Schools, 1977
Wis. L. REV. 989.
155. See, e.g., Vetterli v. United States Dist. Court, 435 U.S. 1304 (1977).
156. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
157. See, e.g., Palos Verdes Faculty Ass'n v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School
Dist., 21 Cal. 3d 650, 580 P.2d 1155, 147 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1978).
158. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
159. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1976).
160. See Brubacher, The Impact of the Courts on Higher Education, 2 J.L. & EDUc. 267,
282 (1973); Ripps, The Tort Liability of the Classroom Teacher, 9 AKRON L. REV. 19, 31-32
(1975).
161. See notes 183-97 & accompanying text infra.
162. See notes 109, 123, 134 & accompanying text supra.
163. The assumption is that, in theory, liability should not be imposed because a defend-
ant is wealthy, rather it is a matter of the defendant's capacity to bear and distribute losses as
part of and incident to the costs of doing business or through insurance. W. PROSSER, THE
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tions obviously are not profit-making enterprises. The courts in Cali-
fornia have stressed that although schools do serve certain secondary
goals, they essentially were created both for the benefit of children and
for the benefits which imbue to parents and the community at large. 64
This view is an outgrowth of the traditional sentiments that the educa-
tional system is directed by a benevolently motivated desire to do
"what is right."' 65 Additionally, in terms of economic parity, the rela-
tionship between the individual and the school is more evenly balanced
and thus differs significantly from that between an individual and a
business entity. This balance results because schools may not soften
the financial impact of litigation, employment of more personnel, or
additional insurance, by distributing costs to consumer-taxpayers. 66
This is particularly true in the face of the current political climate of
heightened budget scrutiny where demands for increased funding face
arduous battles in the state legislature. 67
Other possible reasons for departing in Hoyem from the modem
trends regarding duty are the general nature of truancy and the difficul-
ties of rationally distinguishing claims of truants from the claims of
LAW OF TORTS 22-23 (4th ed. 1971); Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, Part P The Influence of
Environment, 64 WEST VA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1961).
164. Payroll Guar. Ass'n, Inc., v. Board of Educ., 27 Cal. 2d 197, 203, 163 P.2d 433, 436
(1945) (Traynor, J.); McGrath v. Burkhard, 131 Cal. App. 2d 367, 377, 280 P.2d 864, 871
(1955); cf. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51004 (West 1978) (state policy to equip students with viable
skills).
165. See Knickerbocker v. Redlands High School Dist., 49 Cal. App. 2d 722, 727, 122
P.2d 289, 291 (1942).
166. As Justice Clark indicated in his dissent, the efficacy of school district response to
increased financial burdens has been severely limited by the passage of Proposition 13, the
initiative measure adopted by the voters of California in the June 1978 Primary Election.
Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 524-25, 585 P.2d 851, 861, 150
Cal. Rptr. 1, 11 (1978). This measure, commonly known as the Jarvis-Gann initiative, ad-
ded article XIII A to the California Constitution. The new law alters the previous system of
real property taxation and tax procedure and imposes severe limitations upon the assessment
and taxing powers of state and local governments. Proposition 13 was discussed and upheld
against constitutional challenge in Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
167. The decisions in educational funding are, of course, inherently political and in
modern times continue to raise considerable controversy. See generally Chu, Political Eff-
cacy" 7he Problems ofMoney, Race and Control in the Schools, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 989; Long,
Litigation Concerning Educational Finance, in THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH YEARBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF EDUCATION, PART 1, THE COURTS AND EDUCA-
TION 217 (1977).
The battle between lawmakers and educators is exemplified by a press conference re-
cently held by California's State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Wilson Riles. The
conference was the starting point for a massive lobbying campaign to increase financing 46r
public schools. Riles "grimly warned" those present that unless the legislature adoiied a
long-term financial support program the California public school system would be closed by
1981. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 2, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
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other students. Truancy presents an inevitable risk to school opera-
tion. 168 Given the past ingenuity, frequency, and differing motives of
student attempts to engage in truancy, 169 it can be expected that stu-
dents will continue to depart successfully from campuses in secrecy and
in defiance of school rules.170 That students will also continue, as they
have "[s]ince . . .the days of Huck Finn and Tom Sawyer,"''7 to en-
gage in adventuresome and dangerous activities can also be expected.
Moreover, a finding of liability for truant injuries, despite their
constant and unavoidable threat, creates an anomalous and uncertain
situation by affording greater legal protection for truants than for a
child lawfully on the way home from school or a child engaging in an
approved off-campus activity. A child who becomes sick and leaves
school with permission, participates in a field trip to a county museum,
or simply rides his bike home after school hours either waives all
claims against the school district or has no cause of action at all for
injuries. 72 A truant, however, who steals away, regardless of his pur-
pose or destination, is not barred from recovery for injuries.
The uncertainty that results is evident when attempts are made to
168. Despite the threat of truancy, it is exceedingly difficult for school authorities to
remove recidivist truants from schools. Habitual truants may not be suspended or expelled
or suspended from school and must be subjected to other "alternatives." CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 48900 (West 1978). Such truants must be first referred to an attendance review board.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601.1 (West 1975). It is only after the attendance review board
decides that a habitual truant cannot be corrected or has failed to respond to orders that he
or she can be subjected to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and thus be adjudged a ward
of the court. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West 1975).
169. One study done on student attendance in general cited a number of factors influ-
encing students to fail to attend or to leave school without permission: dislike or boredom
with school, social adjustment problems, influence of friends, academic problems, and ill-
ness. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, REPORT TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COM-
MITTEE, ATTENDANCE AND ABSENTEEISM IN CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS 22 (March 1979). Most
student attendance problems, however, are not attributable to illness and result from nega-
tive attitudes toward school. See Absenteeism. The Perpetual Problem, THE PRACTITIONER,
Oct. 1978, at 1-3 (newsletter of the National Association of Secondary School Principals).
170. There are no figures available on the number of students who arrive at school and
later "cut" class or leave school grounds without permission. Perhaps due to the limits of
study, most reports simply compile statistical surveys on "unexcused" absences in general
and do not distinguish between absences for the entire day and those for but a portion of the
day. One study, however, is significant in that by breaking high school pupil attendance in
California into class periods it found that absenteeism was higher in the afternoon (19-22%)
than it was in the morning (16-18%). OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, REPORT TO THE
JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMITTEE, ATTENDANCE AND ABSENTEEISM IN CALIFORNIA
SCHOOLS 18-20 (March 1979). The logical inference of these statistics is that on the high
school level somewhere between 1-6% of the students attending morning classes will "cut"
their afternoon classes.
171. Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 520, 585 P.2d 851,
858, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1978).
172. See notes 23-28 & accompanying text supra.
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distinguish the claims of truants. An obvious question is whether
truants who are injured after school hours would be able to recover. A
truant might, for example, leave school at noon, wander around town
until well after school hours and when he finally starts home, suffer
injuries. In such a case he might have a cause of action and yet a stu-
dent who remained on campus until the end of the school day would
not. As another example, a truant might depart from school and then
later return to a point near campus and join up with a friend who has
lawfully terminated his or her school day. If both were injured in the
same accident it is possible that the truant would be able to recover
from the school while the friend would be without a remedy against the
school.
While such results are unlikely, these examples do demonstrate
that if the Hoyem court chose not to apply a rigid rule of duty to the
instant facts, another court might have to resort to such a solution in a
later case by precluding liability for injuries suffered by truants after
school hours. If this circumstance occurred, the courts could perhaps
reason that a student can no longer be truant after school hours. 173 A
further anomolous result would thus be presented: a truant injured a
few moments before school is terminated could state a cause of action,
while a truant injured after school, possibly ten minutes later, could
not. At some point the courts might have to draw a line among the
claims of individual truants. The prospect of an ultimate resort to vic-
tim status in denying claims lends credence to the argument that the
most clear rule, and that which avoids the disparity in remedy between
truant and nontruant injuries, is one that precludes liability for all tru-
ant harm.
Another factor calling for restraint in applying modern notions of
duty in Hoyem is that if educators are to perform their broad duties,
they must have clearly defined limits regarding their responsibility to
control and supervise students. Schoolyard negligence, however, is dif-
ficult to define. For example, while school authorities can not be abso-
lute insurers of student safety, 74 no standards exist regarding the
number of students one supervisor may adequately oversee or the mini-
mum standard of attention that must be devoted to pupil activities.175
173. This reasoning would be supported by CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48264 (West 1978)
which permits authorities to arrest truants only during school hours and only within the
county, city, or school district in which the school is located. The limitations on the power to
arrest truants provided by this section raise further potential inconsistencies: if the court
found that schools could be liable for after-hours truant injuries, schools would have no
authority to take truants under control. The same inconsistent limitation would apply to
truants outside the school district, city, or county boundaries.
174. Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 12 Cal. 2d 310, 317, 83 P.2d 948, 951 (1938).
175. Rodrigues v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 157 Cal. App. 2d 842, 848, 322 P.2d 70,
74 (1958).
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The simplest formulation would be that school authorities must super-
vise the conduct of students at all times and enforce any rules and regu-
lations necessary for their safety. 76 Applied to truancy, this means that
during the school day, schools must provide sufficient supervision to
prevent students from leaving campus and suffering "foreseeable"
harm. 77
Because this standard is vague, the threat of litigation by students
injured despite a school's precautions would remain. This threat might
encourage schools to direct funds and manpower away from the goal of
education and into safe guarding against truant injuries. Ultimately,
the task of balancing a fundamental role of schools with truant protec-
tion requires the unique managerial expertise of school administrators
and teachers. The standard of care proposed in Hoyem, however, does
not recognize this skill as a factor in determining the scope of the duty
to adequately supervise. Instead, the jury decides the "reasonableness"
of educator's behavior 78 guided by the nonprofessional standard of an
ordinary person entrusted with the care of school age children. 79
These considerations relating to budget limits, political climate,
the nature of truancy, the need for certainty, and the complex role of
professional administrators are all variables which must be weighed in
calculating the risk of truant injury liability. The availability of insur-
ance raises complicated questions. Whether insurance should even be
placed into the balance to determine duty is still a matter into the bal-
ance to determine duty is still a matter of scholarly dispute. 80 Never-
176. See, e.g., Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741. 747. 470 P.2d
360, 363, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1970). See notes 52-56 & accompanying text supra.
177. In the absence of a specific undertaking there is no duty to supervise and prevent
harm to students after school hours. See notes 23-28 & accompanying text supra. Truants.
however, leave school grounds before the school day is over and injuries sustained after
hours present complex questions. See notes 168-71 & accompanying text supra. It is con-
ceivable that the courts will reason that because truants may not be restrained after school
hours, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48264 (West 1978), schools should not be responsible for their
safety after school is terminated. The Hoyem majority, if it is ever presented with a claim
arising from an after school truant injury, however, might not accept this interpretation by
reason of its emphasis that the duty owed was breached on the school property during school
hours. 22 Cal. 3d 508, 514-15, 585 P.2d 851, 854-55, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-5 (1978). Justice
Clark in his dissent also believed that the rule in Hojem might allow truants to recover for
after hours injuries. Id. at 582, 585 P.2d at 863, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
178. Questions relating to the adequacy and reasonableness of supervision are for the
trier of fact. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
179. See note 17 & accompanying text supra.
180. Compare Mancuso, Fault-A Basic Requirement of Sound Public Policy, 38 INS.
COUNSEL J. 397 (1971) (concept of moral fault should be the basis of modem negligence
system) with CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (rational allocation of loss
should be the basis of system). The heavy majority of writers, however, agrees that insur-
ance should play a role. See, e.g., 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 764-84
(1956); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 541-70 (4th ed. 1971).
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theless, the Rowland court did emphasize this possibility as a
component of duty'81 and the courts thus far have deemed it relevant
as a justification for expanding duty. 8 2 The difficulty of obtaining in-
surance has never been relied upon, however, as a reason for restricting
the scope of duty in a majority opinion. 8 3 The possibility that schools
would be victimized by a liability insurance crisis deserved considera-
tion by the court and probably did enter into its decision. The court
certainly would have had to acknowledge that insurers may be more
reluctant to provide protection to schools where the risk of an adverse
judgment hangs on a case-by-case determination than where it is
calculable under specific doctrines that restrict the number of student
injury cases decided by the jury.18 4
Thus the problem of imposing liability for truant injuries is so in-
terrelated with other more broad issues concerning the educational
process that there are few limits on inquiry. Considerations range from
local questions over the type of relationship a teacher must have with
his or her pupils to the statewide issues over the purpose and politics of
education. Despite the myriad factors at work, the California Supreme
Court in Hoyem never addressed the propriety of turning away from its
trends toward increased liability and conceptual simplicity in its defini-
tion of duty.8 5 Instead it delegated the task of weighing these dispa-
rate considerations to the trier of fact. The implication here is that as
the concept of duty is simplified and expanded in some instances the
courts begin to in some instances address problems ill-suited to judicial
resolution.
Hoyem and the Limits of Modem Duty
The Hoyem decision raises significant questions concerning the
propriety of an expansive and simplified concept of duty regarding the
liability of school officials for injuries to truants. Specifically, this de-
voted consistency to a wide sweep in modem liability evidenced in
Hoyem's adoption of a rule of duty defined broadly as "reasonable-
181. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100
(1968). See note 127 & accompanying text supra.
182. CALIFORNIA CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON TORT REFORM, RIGHTING THE LIABILITY
BALANCE 59-60 (1977).
183. Id. at 60.
184. For an analysis of the effect that increased liability has upon the insurance market,
see id. at 60, 89, 94-101, 104-09.
185. Two paragraphs of the majority opinion are devoted to the policy contentions
raised by the defendants. This treatment does not, in reality, examine the validity of the
defendant's fears; Justice Tobriner simply states that since the standard was that of ordinary
care the jury may still absolve the School district of liability even though a student has been
injured. 22 Cal. 3d at 518-19, 585 P.2d at 857, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
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ness" in supervision has required the court to address political ques-
tions of educational planning and quality.
Modem courts have been criticized recently for their abandon-
ment of specificity in negligence doctrine and their endorsement of lia-
bility on a case-by-case basis guided by a unified concept of
"reasonableness."' 86 The essence of this attack is that the use of the
broad definition of duty inevitably leads courts to confront issues not
amenable to the adjudicative process. 87 Certain issues defy adjudica-
tion because they are not susceptible to orderly proof and argument.' 8
Such questions are so inextricably intertwined with other related issues
that the litigants can not focus upon one facet of the problem without
engaging in a simultaneous, precarious balance of all other considera-
tions. These problems have been loosely termed "polycentric" or
"many centered" because the resolution of a particular question is
merely tentative; later, when dealing with other aspects of the question,
previous issues must be reassessed.' 89 Polycentric problems thus are
appropriately termed questions of planning or design requiring a high
degree of individual descretion. Illustrations of this type of problem
typically involve the assessment of complex technology, such as medi-
cal practice or product design, or the weighing of a special relationship,
such as the extent of a governmental service to citizens. 190 In address-
ing claims which are highly polycentric, courts are asked to adjudicate
behavior that can properly be demanded of technicians, managers, doc-
186. See Cooperrider, A Comment on the Law of Torts, 56 MIcH. L. REV. 1291, 1310-12
(1958); Henderson, supra note 100, at 477-78.
187. See Henderson, supra note 100, at 477-78.
188. Professor Fuller argued that certain kinds of social questions are not suitable mate-
rial for the adjudicative process because of the particular institutional framework in which
litigants must operate. This framework accords to the participants the opportunity to pres-
ent proofs and arguments for a decision in their favor. However, because they contain no
single issue toward which the affected parties may direct their proofs and argument in an
orderly manner, some problems are ill-suited to the judicial framework. As a result the
parties, unable to offer proof and argument, are denied the opportunity to affect the court's
"institutional" decision. Moreover, this absence of meaningful participation also impairs
the integrity of the adjudicative system itself. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 1960
PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 1, 1-5.
189. "[P]olycentric problems are many-centered problems, in which each point for deci-
sion is related to all the others as are the strands of a spider web. If [any] one strand is
pulled, a complex pattern of readjustments will occur throughout the entire web. . . . A
lawyer seeking to base his argument upon established principle and required to address
himself in discourse to each of a dozen strands, or issues, would find his task frustratingly
impossible. . . . Unlike most of the traditional types of cases in which litigants are able, in
effect, to freeze the rest of the web as they concentrate upon each separate strand, the web
here retains its natural flexibility, adjusting itself in seemingly infinite variations as each new
point, or strand, in the argument is reached." Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers'
Conscious Design Choices: The Limits ofAdjudication, 73 COLJM. L. REv. 1531, 1536 (1973);
Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1963).
190. Henderson, supra note 100, at 484-514.
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tors, and government agents. Each of these experts are better equipped
than tribunals to gather and analyze complex factual considerations.
Moreover, the complexity of their professional behavior entails a
weighing of diverse interests, such as the proper allocation of resources,
that exceeds the simplicity contemplated by the "reasonableness"
standard. 191
Implicit in these arguments is a recognition that doctrine, or spe-
cific rules of duty, enables a disciplined approach to problems that defy
rational resolution. 192 For example, by invoking notions of status and
situs courts can insulate themselves from or severely limit their inquiry
into these questions by stating there is no duty, that duty is very lim-
ited, or by applying tests of behavior more specific than "reasonable-
ness." In order to achieve the goals of efficient loss-allocation, victim
compensation and accident prevention, however, the modem trend in
duty exerts tremendous pressure upon courts to expand and simplify
concepts of negligence and thus frequently abrogates such limiting or
insulating doctrine. Thus, with the absence of specificity in the defini-
tion of duty courts begin to encroach upon processes which involve
highly discretionary choices. 193
This criticism may obsure the fact that most questions of liability
in tort law are exceedingly complex. Moreover, describing problems as
"polycentric" cannot conceal that most negligence issues are to a de-
gree political and thus involve a balance of complicated and disparate
values. 194 For example, when modem policy needs dictated the abro-
gation of outdated doctrine, the courts in California have been justified
in responding with expansion and simplication. 195 Nonetheless, this
quest for simplicity in and expansion of duty and the concomitant der-
ogation of doctrinal authority typical of the California trend in tort law
has resulted in decisions that at times pay little heed to the substantive
or overall impact of the decision. Thus, in order to reach social and
economic goals courts may become preoccupied with permitting juries
to hear cases guided by the rule of reasonableness, and disregard that
such an approach may produce an irrational result.196 Hoyem is one
such instance.
The decision in Hoyem to extend schoolyard liability to include
injuries to truants ignores the fact that the question of compensating
one victim cannot be considered intelligently without addressing simul-
191. Id,see Henderson, JudicialReview ofManufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of.4djudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973).
192. Henderson, supra note 100, at 477-79. See also Keeton, Creative Continuity In the
Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 463, 468-72 (1962).
193. Henderson, supra note 100, at 477-82.
194. See notes 95-99 & accompanying text supra.
195. See Horvitz, supra note 87.
196. Henderson, supra note 100, at 468.
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taneously its impact on a number of shifting and diverse variables.
Resolution of this problem collides with considerations over the nature
of school financing, the fluctuations in insurance costs, the adverse po-
litical climate faced by schools, the unavoidable risk that truancy
presents to school operation, and the difficulty of distinguishing justly
and consistently among the claims of truants and other students. 97
Moreover, the decision fails to pay deference to the professional
choices made by school authorities who must, on a daily basis, balance
the obligation of supervision against the task of educating students.
This balance is a managerial chore best suited to the discretion of
school officials. Thus, when supervisors and teachers strike the balance
between the fundamental purpose of education and the problem of stu-
dent safety, they must do so with confidence that their intuitive choices
based upon a professional judgment of the particular students, the
physical surroundings of the school, and the nature of the community
will not be upset.1 98
The presence of these complicating factors reveals that more is in-
volved in Hoyem than a dispute reflecting an isolated problem. Essen-
tially, the supreme court was asked to determine the contours of the
complex social relationship between government, educators, parents
and students. The adjudication of this problem addresses the "reasona-
bleness" of an educator's managerial or professional choice. More sig-
nificantly, it attempts to rule on the optimal delegation of educational
resources.
The Tobriner majority, by adhering to the modem trends of duty,
failed to confront the pervasive implications of its own decision. In-
stead, it yielded to the modem pressures to prevent accidents, allocate
loss, and compensate injury by recognizing an essentially new cause of
action and opting for a basic rule of reasonableness. Thus, by rejecting
status and situs doctrine as irrelevant and requiring a case-by-case ap-
proach to the Hoyem problem it delegated the analytical difficulties of
the truant issue to the trier of fact. 99
The Hoyem court, therefore, should have established a limitation
on duty based on injury situs and victim status. A limited rule of duty
phrased in such a way is not necessarily anachronistic, and may present
the most workable approach to ensuring the prediction of risk essential
to school operation. At a critical time for education such a construction
197. See notes 162-71, 178-82 & accompanying text supra.
198. See notes 172-79 & accompanying text supra.
199. Professor Henderson has referred to the application of the "reasonableness" test as
a "judicial sleight of hand" by which a court obscures the analytical difficulties of problems
involving social design and planning. Thus the judiciary abdicates its responsibility to avoid
the role of social planner, and leaves the decision to the collective intuition of the jury.
Henderson, supra note 100, at 478-80.
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would have gone far toward clarifying educators' roles by investing in
them the professional discretion necessary to accomplish a complicated
task. If the California court had been less concerned with conforming
to its own trends in duty and more attentive to the multi-faceted nature
of the truant issue, then it might have exercised more restraint. Be-
cause the court abdicated its responsibility to screen from adjudication
an issue best left to political solution, the state legislature should speak
to the issue by insulating school authorities from liability for truant
injuries.200
Conclusion
Hoyem involved a remarkable confrontation of interests. The call
for greater judicial inquiry into the administration of education, com-
pensation of victims, and continuity was balanced against the value of
placing definable limits upon adjudicability and the need to leave some
decisions to professional discretion. The outcome creates grave doubts
as to the ability of the courts to successfully resolve this balance where
the vexing and far-reaching problem of liability for truant injuries is at
stake. Whether the quality of education will be measurably altered by
Hoyem is difficult to ascertain. The decision, however, by failing to
recognize that educators are professionals with complex roles places the
adequacy of supervisorial practices into a state of uncertainty at a time
when schools should concentrate on more important tasks. Hopefully,
the furthest scope of attempted adjudicability is indicated by Hoyem.
200. A bill to amend CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44808 (West 1978) was introduced in the Cali-
fornia State Senate on Dec. 5, 1978. The bill precluded liability for the "conduct or safety of
any pupil of the public schools not on school property who has left school property without
permission of a school officer or employee during such pupil's prescribed school hours."
S.B. 60 (1979-80). S.B. 60 was amended to condition this bar from liability upon school
authorities' notification or reasonable attempt to notify the parents or guardians of truants
who are discovered missing. The amended bill states that this condition "does not change
the duty of school officers and employees to know or ascertain the whereabouts of school
pupils, or change any possible liability relating to such duty." See Cal. Sen. J., Feb. 16,
1979, at 557, 568.
As an alternative to the proposal in S.B. 60 or to an absolute bar from liability, the
Legislature may wish to consider a standard of care for school authorities that is more spe-
cific than the current standard of an ordinary person entrusted with the care of school age
children. See note 17 & accompanying text supra. For example, a professional standard of
care, the measure of the performance typically offered by other members of the teaching
profession in the community, would provide some specificity and would recognize the spe-
cial complexities of the teacher's role. The question of negligence then would be subject to
expert testimony with respect to the proper behavior in reconciling the daily conflict between
the duties of supervision and instruction. Cf. Landeros . Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 410, 551 P.2d
389, 394, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1976) (medical malpractice actions subject to expert testi-
mony by other physicians). Imposition of a professional standard of care would recognize
that in modem society teachers are charged with a unique role that defies the simple charac-
terization of an "ordinary person charged with the care of school age children."
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If the limits of judicial inquiry are not so evidenced, then the flexible
and expansive nature of modem duty may again immerse the Califor-
nia courts in questions, such as those concerning the design and plan of
public education, that are inherently political.
